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If a concept is not well defined, there are grounds for its abuse. This is particularly true of complexity, an inherently 
interdisciplinary concept that has penetrated very different fields of intellectual activity from physics to linguistics, 
but with no underlying, unified theory. Complexity has become a popular buzzword used in the hope of gaining 
attention or funding -- institutes and research networks associated with complex systems grow like mushrooms.  
Why and how did it happen that this vague notion has become a central motif in modern science? Is it only a 
fashion, a kind of sociological phenomenon, or is it a sign of a changing paradigm of our perception of the laws of 
nature and of the approaches required to understand them? Because virtually every real system is inherently 
extremely complicated, to say that a system is complex is almost an empty statement – couldn’t an Institute of 
Complex Systems just as well be called an Institute for Almost Everything?  Despite these valid concerns, the world 
is indeed made of many highly interconnected parts over many scales, whose interactions result in a complex 
behaviour needing separate interpretation for each level. This realization forces us to appreciate that new features 
emerge as one goes from one scale to another, so it follows that the science of complexity is about revealing the 
principles governing the ways by which these new properties appear.  
 
In the past, mankind has learned to understand reality through simplification and analysis. Some important simple 
systems are successful idealizations or primitive models of particular real situations, for example, a perfect sphere 
rolling down on an absolutely smooth slope in vacuum. This is the world of newtonian mechanics, and involves 
ignoring a huge number of simultaneously acting other factors. Although it might sometimes not matter if details 
such as the billions of atoms dancing inside the sphere's material are ignored, in other cases reductionism may lead 
to incorrect conclusions. In complex systems, we accept that processes occurring simultaneously on different scales 
or levels matter, and the intricate behaviour of the whole system depends on its units in a non-trivial way. Here, the 
description of the behaviour of the whole system requires a qualitatively new theory, because the laws describing its 
behaviour are qualitatively different from those describing its units.  
 
Take, for example, turbulent flows and the brain. Clearly these are very different systems, but they share a few 
remarkable features, including the impossibility of predicting the rich behaviour of the whole by merely 
extrapolating from the behaviour of its units. Who can tell from studying a little drop or a single neuron what are the 
laws describing the intricate flow patterns in turbulence or the electrical activity patterns produced by the brain? 
Moreover, both these systems (and many others) are such that randomness and determinism are both relevant to 
their global behaviour. They exist on the edge of chaos; they are able to produce nearly regular behaviour, but also 
can change dramatically and stochastically in time and/or space as a result of small changes in conditions. This 
seems to be a general property of systems capable of producing interesting (complex) behaviour.  
 
Knowledge of the physics of elementary particles is therefore useless for these higher scales. Entering a new level or 
scale is accompanied by new, emerging laws governing it. When creating life, nature acknowledged the existence of 
these levels by spontaneously separating them as molecules, macromolecules, cells, organisms, species and 
societies. The big question is whether there is a unified theory for the ways elements of a system organize 
themselves to produce a behaviour typical for wide classes of systems. Interesting principles have been proposed, 
including self-organization, simultaneous existence of many degrees of freedom, self-adaptation, rugged energy 
landscape and scaling (for example power-law dependence) of the parameters and the underlying network of 
connections. Physicists are learning how to build relatively simple models producing complicated behaviour, while 
those working on inherently very complex systems (biologists or economists, say) are uncovering the ways their 
infinitely complicated subjects can be interpreted in terms of interacting, well-defined units (such as proteins).  
 
What we are witnessing in this context is a change of paradigm in attempts to understand our world as we realize 
that the laws of the whole cannot be deduced by digging deeper into the details. In a way, this change has been 
invoked by development of instruments. Traditionally, improved microscopes or bigger telescopes are built to 
understand better particular problems. But computers have allowed new ways of learning. By directly modelling a 
system made of many units, one can observe, manipulate and understand the behaviour of the whole system much 
better than before, as in networks of model neurons and virtual auctions by intelligent agents, for example. In this 
sense, a computer is a tool improving not our sight (as in the microscope or telescope), but our insight into 
mechanisms within a complex system. Further, use of computers to store, generate and analyse huge databases -- the 
fingerprints of systems that people otherwise could not comprehend.  
 
Many scientists implicitly assume that the understanding of a particular phenomenon is achieved if a (computer) 
model provides results in good agreement with the observations and leads to correct predictions. Yet such models 
allow us to simulate systems far more complex than those that have solvable equations. In the newtonian world, 
exact or accurate solutions of the equations of motion provide predictions for future events. As a rule, models of 
complex systems result in a probabilistic prediction of behaviour, and the form in which conclusions are made is less 
rigorous compared to classical quantitative theories, even involving elements of ‘poetry’.  
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